Many countries use college-major-speci…c admissions policies that require a student to choose a college-major pair upon college enrollment. Motivated by potential student-major mismatches under such policies, we explore the equilibrium e¤ects of postponing student choice of major. To do so, we develop an equilibrium model of college-major choices under the college-major-speci…c admissions regime and estimate its structural parameters using data from Chile.
Introduction
In countries such as Canada and the U.S., students are admitted to colleges without declaring their majors until later years in their college life.
1 Peer students in the same classes during early college years may end up choosing very di¤erent majors later on. In contrast, many countries in Asia, Europe and Latin America (Chile as a leading example) use college-major-speci…c admissions rules. A student is admitted to a speci…c college-major pair and attends classes with peers (mostly) from his/her own major upon college enrollment. We label these two admissions systems by their representative countries as Sys. US and Sys. Chile, respectively. To the extent that college education is aimed at providing the society with specialized personnel, Sys. Chile may be e¢ cient if potential college enrollees have su¢ cient information about their suitability to di¤erent majors. Because it facilitates the allocation of resources across majors and maximizes the interaction among students with similar comparative advantages. However, if students are uncertain about their …ts, such a system may lead to serious mismatch problems. Given the same population of students, e¢ ciency comparison across these two admissions systems depends critically on the degree of uncertainty faced by students, the relative importance of peer e¤ect, and student sorting behavior that determines equilibrium peer quality.
In this paper, we develop an equilibrium model of student sorting under Sys. Chile, allowing for post-enrollment uncertainties and peer e¤ects. We apply it to the case of Chile, where we have obtained detailed micro-level data on college enrollment from the Chilean Department of Evaluation and Educational Testing Service, and on job market returns from the Ministry of Education of Chile. Our …rst goal is to recover the structural parameters underlying the observed equilibrium sorting among Chilean students. Based on the estimation result, our second goal is to examine changes in student welfare and the distribution of educational outcomes if, instead of college-major-speci…c admissions, Chile adopts college-speci…c admissions and allows students to learn about themselves before declaring majors. Although our empirical analysis focuses on the case of Chile, our framework is general enough to be applied to other countries with similar admissions systems.
In our model, students di¤er in their (multi-dimensional) abilities and educational preferences, and they face uncertainty about their suitability to various majors. The cost of and return to college education not only depends on one's own characteristics, but may also depend on the quality of one's peers attending the same program. In the baseline case (Sys. Chile), there are two decision periods. First, a student makes college-major enrollment decision, based on his/her expectations about peer quality across di¤erent academic programs and about how well suited he/she is to various majors. The choices of individual students, in turn, determine the equilibrium peer quality. In the second period, a college enrollee learns about his/her …t to the chosen major and decides whether or not to continue his/her studies.
In our counterfactual policy experiments (Sys. US), a planner chooses optimal college-speci…c, rather than college-major-speci…c, admissions policies; students make enrollment decisions and postpone their choices of majors until after they learn about their …ts to various majors. Although individual students always maximize their own welfare, the eventual sorting need not be e¢ cient due to the existence of peer e¤ects. Using optimal admissions policies, the planner guides student sorting toward the maximization of their overall welfare.
Several factors have major implications on the changes in equilibrium outcomes as Sys. Chile switches into Sys. US. The …rst is the degree of uncertainty students face about their major-speci…c …ts, which we …nd to be nontrivial. Indeed, a lot of college dropouts occur under the current Chilean system because of student-major mismatches: the overall college retention rate increases from 75% in the baseline to 90% in the counterfactual.
Second, in contrast to Sys. Chile, where peer students are from the same major upon college enrollment, Sys. US features a much broader student body in …rst-period classes. While students di¤er in their comparative advantages, some students have advantages over others in multiple majors, and some majors have superior student quality. With the switch from Sys. Chile to Sys. US, on the one hand, the quality of …rst-period peers in "elite" majors will decline; on the other hand, "non-elite" majors will bene…t from having "elite" students in their …rst-period classes. The overall e¢ ciency depends on, among other factors, which of the two e¤ects dominates. Our estimation results show that for "elite" majors, such as medicine, law and engineering, own ability is more important than peer ability in determining one's market return, while the opposite is true for "non-elite" majors such as education. Combining this fact with the improvement in student-major match quality, we …nd that the average productivity of college graduates improves in all majors when Sys. US is adopted.
Finally, as students spend time trying out di¤erent majors, their specialized training is postponed as the price. Welfare comparisons vary with how high this price is. We …nd that average student welfare will increase by a monetary equivalent of 4:6 million pesos or 5%; if delayed specialization under Sys. US does not reduce the amount of marketable skills one obtains in college compared to Sys. Chile.
2 At the other extreme, if the …rst period in college contributes zero to one's skills under Sys. US, and if a student has to make up for this loss by extending his/her college life accordingly, a 0:9% loss in mean welfare will result. In an alternative design, instead of extending the duration of college education for all majors, we allow students in most majors to graduate in time and spend only their upper college years specializing. Under this framework, if the shortened speci…c training causes a 20% loss of human capital ceteris paribus, average student welfare will keep the same as the Sys. Chile switches into Sys. US. Our paper is closely related to studies that treat education as a sequential choice made under uncertainty and stress the importance of speci…city of human capital. 3 For example, Altonji (1993) introduces a model where students learn their preferences and probabilities of completion in two …elds of study during college years. Arcidiacono (2004) estimates a structural dynamic model of college and major choice in the U.S., where students learn about their abilities via test scores in college before settling down to their majors. As in our paper, he allows peer quality to a¤ect one's market return as well as utility in college. 4 Given his focus on individual decisions, peer quality is treated as exogenous.
5
While this literature has been focusing on individual decision problems, our goal is to study the educational and labor market outcomes for the population of students, and to provide predictions about these outcomes under counterfactual policy regimes. One cannot achieve this goal without modeling student sorting in an equilibrium framework, because peer quality may change as students re-sort themselves under di¤erent policy regimes.
2 1 USD is about 484 Chilean Pesos. 3 Examples of theoretical papers in this regard include Manski (1989) and Comay, Melnick, and Pollachek (1973) . 4 There is a large and controversial literature on peer e¤ects. Methodological issues are discussed in Manski (1993 ), Mo¢ tt (2001 , and Brock and Durlauf (2001) . Limiting discussion to recent research on peer e¤ects in higher education, Sacerdote (2001) and Zimmerman (2003) …nd peer e¤ects between roommates on grade point averages. Betts and Morell (1999) …nd that high-school peer groups a¤ect college grade point average. Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005) …nd no peer e¤ects among medical students. Dale and Krueger (1998) have mixed …ndings.
5 For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the demand for and return to education by …eld of study in the U.S., see Altonji, Blom and Meghir (2011) . As an example of non-U.S. studies, Malamud (2010) compares the labor market consequences across the English (Sys. Chile) and Scottish (Sys. US) undergraduate systems using a regression approach and …nds that the average earnings are not signi…cantly di¤erent between the two countries.
In its emphasis on equilibrium structure, our paper is related to Epple, Romano and Sieg (2006) and Fu (2011) . Both papers study college enrollment in a decentralized market, where colleges compete for better students.
6 Given our goal of addressing e¢ ciency-related issues, and the fact that colleges in Sys. Chile countries are often coordinated, we study a di¤erent type of equilibrium, where the players include students and a single planner. In this centralized environment, we abstract from the determination of tuition, which is likely to be more important in decentralized market equilibria studied by Epple, Romano and Sieg (2006) and Fu (2011) ; instead, we emphasize some other aspects of college education that are absent in these two previous studies but are more essential to our purpose. In particular, we emphasize the multi-dimensionality of abilities and uncertainties over major-student …ts, and relate college education to job market outcomes. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some background information about education in Chile. Section 3 lays out the model. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 describes our estimation followed by the empirical results. Section 7 conducts counterfactual policy experiments. The last section concludes the paper. The appendix contains additional details and tables.
Background: Education in Chile
There are three types of high schools in Chile: scienti…c-humanist (regular), technicalprofessional (vocational) and artistic. Most students who want to pursue a college degree attend the …rst type. In their 11th grade, students choose to follow a certain academic track based on their broad interests, where a track can be humanities, sciences or arts. From then on, students receive more advanced training in subjects corresponding to their chosen tracks.
The higher education system in Chile consists of three types of institutions: universities, professional institutes, and technical formation centers. Universities provide the highest degree of learning, combining teaching, research and outreach activities. They o¤er licentiate degree programs and award academic degrees. In 2011, for example, total enrollment in universities accounts for over 60% of all Chilean stu- 6 Epple, Romano and Sieg (2006) Students following di¤erent academic tracks in high school will take either one or both speci…c exam(s). Together with the cumulative grade point average achieved during high school, the various PSU test scores are the only components of an index used in the admissions process. This index is formed by taking a weighted average of its components, where the weights di¤er across college programs. A student is admitted to a speci…c college-major pair if his/her index, calculated using the relevant weights, is above the cuto¤ index required by this program. That is, college admissions are college-major speci…c. A student must choose a college-major pair in making his/her enrollment decision.
In our analysis, colleges refer only to the traditional universities for several reasons. First, our …nal goal is to examine the consequences of a centralized reform to the Chilean admissions process. This experiment is more applicable to the traditional universities, which are coordinated and state-funded, and follow a single admissions process. Second, although non-traditional private universities are growing in numbers, they are usually considered inferior to the traditional universities. Moreover, most of these private colleges follow (almost) open-admissions policies; and we consider it more appropriate to treat them as part of the outside option for students in our model. Finally, we have detailed enrollment data only for traditional universities.
Model

Primitives
There is a continuum of students with di¤erent gender, family income, abilities and academic interests. There are J colleges, each with M majors; and we denote each academic program as a pair (j; m). Admissions to these programs are subject to program-speci…c standards. There is also an outside option available to all students.
Student Characteristics
A student may come from one of the family income groups In 2 flow; highg :
9 He/She has multi-dimensional knowledge in subjects such as math, language, social science and science, measured by s = [s 1 ; s 2 ; :::; s S ], the vector of test scores. 10 Various elements of such knowledge are combined with major-speci…c weights to form majorspeci…c ability
where ! m = [! 1 m ; :::; ! S m ] is the vector of major-m-speci…c weights and P S l=1 ! l m = 1. ! m 's di¤er across majors: for example, an engineer uses math knowledge more and language knowledge less than a journalist. As one's multi-dimensional knowledge is used in various majors, although with di¤erent weights, one's major-speci…c abilities are correlated.
Given the di¤erent academic tracks they follow in high school, some students will consider only majors that emphasize knowledge in science subjects, some will consider only majors that emphasize knowledge in social science subjects, and some are open to all majors. Such broad interests are re ‡ected in their test scores, hence in their abilities.
11 Let the observable characteristics of a student be x = [a; In; g] ; where a is the vector of major-speci…c abilities, and g stands for gender. Denote the joint distribution by F x ( ):
Consumption Values and Costs
The consumption value of a particular major enters one's utility both in college and in workforce. This value depends on one's ability: an individual with higher ability a m may …nd it more enjoyable (less costly) to study in major m and work in major m related jobs. We also allow for gender di¤erences in major preferences: some majors may appeal more to an average female student than to an average male student. 12 In addition, each student has his/her own idiosyncratic tastes for majors, represented by a random vector
In sum, the per-period consumption value of major
where we have normalized the mean major-speci…c consumption values for males to zero, m is the mean major m value for females, and m 's measure how one's consumption value in major m changes with one's major-speci…c ability.
14 Besides the consumption value one attaches to his/her major, a student also derives consumption value provided by his/her academic program while in college. Net of cost, the per-period consumption value of attending program (j; m) is
where 2 jm is one's taste for program (j; m). Let F ( ) denote the joint distribution of the unobserved idiosyncratic tastes for major and for academic programs
An individual student's tastes are correlated across majors within a college, and across colleges given the same major. C jm (x; A jm ) is the cost of attending program (j; m) ; which is a function of own characteristics x and peer quality A jm , the average major m ability of enrollees in (j; m) : 15 For example, it may be more challenging to 12 Gender-speci…c preferences may arise from not only individual tastes, but also social norms and other channels. We label the combination of all these potential factors as "gender-speci…c tastes." 13 We will adopt the convention that 1 m = 1 if m is not in one's broad interest. 14 In the estimation, we restrict 2m to be the same across majors. 15 Arguably, the entire distribution of peer ability may a¤ect the cost of and return to education. For feasibility reasons, we follow the common practice in the literature and assume that only the average peer quality matters. attend a class with high-ability peers because of direct peer pressure and/or because of curriculum designs that cater to average student ability. In either case, individuals with di¤erent own abilities are likely to feel this e¤ect di¤erently.
Skills and Wages
The level of skills one builds up in college depends on one's major speci…c ability (a m ), the quality of the one's peers (A jm ) ; and how e¢ cient one is at his/her major. 16 The last determinant, the major-speci…c e¢ ciency, reveals to a student only after he/she takes courses in that major. Denote one's major-speci…c e¢ ciency levels as f m g m~i :i:d:F ( ). The human capital production function reads
Wage is major-speci…c and it is a stochastic function of one's human capital (hence of a m ; m ; A jm ), work experience ( ) and one's other observable characteristics, where the randomness comes from a transitory wage shock : In particular, the wage rate for a graduate from program (j; m) is given by w m ( ; x; m ; A jm ; ) :
Timing:
There are three stages in this model. Stage 1: Students make college-major enrollment decisions, subject to admissions policies: Stage 2: A college enrollee in major m observes his/her major-speci…c e¢ ciency m , and chooses to stay or to drop out at the end the …rst period in college: 18;19 16 There are di¤erent channels through which peer ability a¤ects one's market return, including direct e¤ects on human capital production, statistical discrimination on the labor market, social network, etc. Our data does not allow us to distinguish among various channels. For ease of illustration, we will label peer e¤ect as if it a¤ects one's human capital production.
17 Notice that h m ( ) represents the total amount of marketable skills. As such, h m ( ) may be a combination of pure major-speci…c skill and general skill. 18 We assume that an enrollee fully observes her e¢ ciency in her major by the end of Stage 2. It will be interesting to allow for partial learning. Given the lack of information on student performance in college, we leave such extensions to future work. 19 Transfers across programs are rare in Chile. "..., students must choose an academic …eld at the inception of their studies. With a few exceptions, lateral mobility between academic programmes is not permitted, even within institutions." (Reviews of National Policies for Education: Tertiary Education in Chile ( 
Student Problem
This subsection solves the student's problem backwards.
Continuation Decision
After his/her …rst period in college, an enrollee in (j; m) observes his/her majorspeci…c e¢ ciency level m , and decides whether to continue studying or to drop out, given peer quality A jm . Let V d (x) be the value of dropping out for student x.
21 A student's second-period problem reads
If the student chooses to continue his/her education, he/she will stay one more period in college, obtaining the net consumption value v jm (x; ; A jm ); and then enjoy the monetary and consumption value of his/her major after college from period 3 to retirement period T = 45; discounted at rate . Let y 2 jm (x; ; m ) = 1 if an enrollee in program (j; m) chooses to continue his/her study.
College-Major Choice
Denote jm (a) = 1 if a student of ability a is admitted to program (j; m) : Under the Chilean system, jm (a) = 1 if only if a m a jm ; where a jm is the (j; m)-speci…c cuto¤. Given the peer quality of each program fA jm g jm , a student chooses the best among the programs he/she is admitted to and the outside option with value V 0 (x).
20 We treat the …rst two years in college as the …rst college period in the model, and the rest of college years as the second period, which di¤ers across majors. Student value functions are adjusted accordingly.
21 See Appendix A1 for speci…c functional form assumptions on
Equilibrium
De…nition 1 Given the admissions rule jm (a) jm ; an equilibrium consists of a set of student enrollment and continuation strategies y 1 jm (x; ); y 2 jm (x; ; m ) jm ; and the enrollment and peer quality of each academic program f jm ; A jm g jm ; such that (a) Given A jm ; y 2 jm (x; ; m ) is an optimal continuation decision for every (x; ; m ); (b) Given A jm ; jm (a) jm ; y 1 jm (x; j (a)) jm is an optimal enrollment decision for every (x; ) ; (c) Consistency condition holds: f jm ; A jm g jm is consistent with individual decisions such that
An equilibrium of this model can be viewed as a classical …xed-point of an equilibrium correspondence that maps the support of f jm ; A jm g jm onto itself: Such a …xed point exists under suitable regularity conditions. In the appendix, we outline the algorithm we use to search for equilibria, which we always …nd in practice.
Data
Data Sources and Sample Selection
Our …rst data source is the Chilean Department of Evaluation and Educational Testing Service, which records the PSU scores and high school GPA of all test takers and the college-major enrollment information if a student was enrolled in one of the 25 traditional universities. Although macro-level information is available for multiple years, we obtained micro-level information only for the 2011 freshmen cohort. There are 247; 360 PSU test takers in 2011. We focus on the 159; 365 students, who met the minimum requirement for admission to at least one college-major program 22 For a student, the enrollment choice is generically unique. and who were not admitted based on special talents such as athletes. 23 From the 159; 265 students, we draw 10; 000 students as our …nal sample due to computational considerations.
24;25
Our second data source is Futuro Laboral, a project of the Ministry of Education that follows a random sample of college graduates (classes 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2001) . This panel data set matches tax returns with students'college admissions information, so we observe the worker's annual earnings, months worked, high school GPA, PSU scores, and the college-major he/she graduated from. For each cohort, earnings information is available from graduation until 2005. We calculated the monthly real wage based on annual earnings and months worked, then we calculated the annual wage as 12 times the monthly wage, measured in thousands of pesos. 26 For each major, we trimmed our wage data at the 2nd and the 98th percentiles. The two most recent cohorts have the largest numbers of observations without missing information, and they have very similar observable characteristics. We combined these two cohorts to obtain our measures of abilities and annual wage levels among graduates from di¤erent college-major pairs. We also use the wage information from the two earlier cohorts to obtain information on major-speci…c wage growth at higher work experience levels. In our …nal sample, there are 19; 201 individuals from the combined 2000-2001 cohorts, and 10; 618 from the earlier cohorts.
The enrollment data provides us with measures of individual ability, enrollment and peer quality, but not the market return to college education. The wage data, on the other hand, contains wages for college graduates, but not the quality of their peers while in college. We combine these two data sets in our empirical analysis. We standardized the test scores according to the cohort-speci…c mean and standard deviation to make the test scores comparable across cohorts. As such, we have created a synthetic cohort, the empirical counterpart of students in our model.
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23 Ineligible students can only choose the outside option and will not contribute to the estimation of the model. 24 For each parameter con…guration, we have to solve for equilibrium via an iterative procedure as discussed in the appendix. Each iteration involves solving every student's problem, since each of them has a di¤erent set of observables x; and there is no analytical solution to student problem. Moreover, we have to numerically integrate out the unobserved tastes for each student.
25 Some options are chosen by students at much lower frequency than others. To improve e¢ ciency, we conduct choice-based sampling with weights calculated from the distribution of choices in the population of 159; 365 students. The weighted sample is representative. See Manski and McFadden (1981) . 26 Student utility is also measured in thousands of pesos. 27 Given data availability, we have to make the assumption that there exists no systematic di¤erence Our graduate wage data only allows us to observe one's wage path in the early stage of his/her career. In order to obtain information on wage growth at higher experience levels, we resort to the cross-sectional data from the Chilean Characterization Socioeconomic Survey (CASEN), which is similar to the Current Population Survey in the U.S. We compare the average wages across di¤erent cohorts of college graduates to obtain measures of wage growth at di¤erent experience levels. Although not ideal, such measures restrict the model from predicting unrealistic wage paths in one's later career in order to …t other aspects of the data.
Our last data source is the Indices database from the Ministry of Education of Chile. In this data set, we obtain information on college-major-speci…c tuition, weights ! l m used to form the admission score index, the admission cuto¤s a jm ; as well as enrollment sizes in consecutive years.
Aggregation of Academic Programs
For both sample size and computational reasons, we have aggregated the speci…c majors into 8 categories according to the area of study, coursework, PSU requirements and average wage levels. The 8 aggregated majors are: Business, Education, Arts and Social Sciences, Sciences, Engineering, Health, Medicine and Law. 28 We also aggregated individual traditional universities into 3 tiers based on admissions criteria, student quality and university prestige. As such, students are faced with 25 options, including the outside option, in making their enrollment decisions. The …rst column in Table 1 shows the number of colleges in each tier. The second column shows the quality of students within each tier, measured by the average of math and language scores. In the parentheses, we show the cross-college standard deviations of the within-college mean scores. In columns 3 and 4, we show similar statistics for total enrollment and tuition. Cross-tier di¤erences are clear: higherranked colleges have better students, larger enrollment and higher tuition. across cohorts conditional on comparable test scores. This assumption rules out, for example, the possibility that di¤erent cohorts may face di¤erent degrees of uncertainties.
28 All these majors, including law and medicine, are o¤ered as undergraduate majors in Chile. across freshmen within a college.
b The average tuition (in 1000 pesos) across majors within a college.
c Cross-college std. deviation shown in parenthesis.
Summary Statistics
In this subsection, we provide summary statistics for the aggregated tier-major categories based on our …nal sample. Table 2 shows summary statistics by student enrollment status. The …rst three columns show that both test scores and graduate wage levels are consistently ranked across tiers. The next two columns show the fractions of students who chose the correpsonding options among, respectively, all students and females. Over 71% of students in the sample were not enrolled in any of the traditional universities and only 5% were enrolled in the top tier. 29 Compared to males, females are less likely than males to enroll in college and even less so in better colleges. The maximum score for each subject is 850. Std. deviation among students is in parenthesis.
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b Log of starting wage in 1000 pesos. We only have wage info for CRUCH college grads. Table 3 shows the characteristics of enrollees by major. We list the majors in the order of average starting wages as we observe in the data. 31 This rank is also roughly consistent with the rank of average test scores across majors. For example, medical students have absolute advantages over all other students, while education students are at the other extreme. Comparative advantages di¤er across majors. For example, law and social science majors have clear comparative advantage in language, while the opposite is true for engineering and science majors. The last two columns show the fraction of students in each major among, respectively, all enrollees and female enrollees. Females are signi…cantly more likely to major in education and health but much less likely to major in engineering. Di¤erent enrollment patterns across genders may arise both from unobserved tastes and from comparative advantages, which will be illustrated later. 
Estimation
We estimate the structural parameters of the model via simulated generalized method of moment (SGMM). 32 For each parameter con…guration, we solve for the equilibrium and compute the model-predicted moments. The parameter estimates minimize the distance between the model-predicted moments (M (X; )) and the data moments
where W is a positive-de…nite weighting matrix.
Target Moments
The moments we target come from di¤erent data sources and capture various key predictions from the model. Although all model predictions are joint outcomes from the equilibrium model, di¤erent moments contain di¤erent amounts of information on various subsets of model parameters. The PSU data allows us to compute enrollment and peer quality, the key variables that summarize equilibrium student sorting. It also provides other information critical for the identi…cation of students'preferences. For example, to pursue the same major, some students chose to attend a lowerranked college while others chose to attend a higher-ranked one although they have similar observables. This informs us about students'dispersed preferences for colleges. Similarly, the fraction of students who chose a less lucrative major although they could get in a more lucrative one informs us about the dispersion of tastes for majors.
The wage data provides key information about major-speci…c market returns, human capital production technology, as well as the quality of college graduates. In total, we estimate 88 free parameters by matching the following 448 moments.
PSU Data and College Data
(1) Enrollment status: Fractions of students across tier-major (j; m) pairs overall, for females and for low income group. (4) Retention rate by (j; m) calculated from aggregated enrollments in the college data.
Wage Data
(1) Graduate ability:
First and second moments of major-m ability among graduates by (j; m) :
(2) Starting wage: First and second moments of log starting wage by (j; m). First moments of log starting wage by (j; m) for females. Cross moments of log starting wage and major-speci…c ability by (j; m) :
(3) Wage growth: Mean of the …rst di¤erences of log wage by major for experience level t = 1; :::; 9: From the CASEN data: …rst di¤erence of the mean log wage at experience level t = 10; :::; 40.
Results
Parameter Estimates
In this section, we report the estimates of parameters of major interests. The appendix reports the estimates for other parameters. The standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated via bootstrapping. Table 4 shows parameters governing the production of human capital, which also measure the elasticities of wage with respect to own ability and to peer ability. 34 33 Standard …rst-order Taylor expansions yield very small standard errors that might be problematic because we have to use numerical method to calculate the derivatives of our GMM objective function. 34 Own ability refers to the major-speci…c ability a m in the corresponding major m; not the whole vector a. Peer ability refers to the average major-speci…c ability among peers in the same program A jm :
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Focusing on the right panel …rst, we …nd signi…cant di¤erences in the importance of peer ability across majors: the elasticity of wage with respect to peer quality ranges from 0:01 in medicine to 1:48 in business. 35 Considering both the left and the right panels, we …nd that the relative importance of peer ability versus own ability di¤ers systematically across majors although no restriction has been imposed in this respect. In particular, for majors with the highest average wages, medicine, law and engineering, the elasticity of wage with respect to peer ability is at most half of that with respect to own ability, while the opposite is true for education, the major with the lowest average wage. For the other four majors, peer ability is as important as one's own ability. This …nding has major implications for welfare analysis as we switch from Sys. Chile to Sys. US, because the quality of …rst-period peers will decline for "elite" majors, while increase for "non-elite" majors. Table 4 suggests that the former negative e¤ect is likely to be small, while the latter positive e¤ect may be signi…cant. Another interesting …nding from Table 4 is that wages are very inelastic to both own ability and peer ability in medicine. In other words, although medical students face a very high rental rate of their human capital (as shown in Table A2 .4 in the appendix), their wages are concave in ability measures. This implies that although precollege ability measures can largely distinguish bad doctors from mediocre doctors, it is individual suitability realized after enrollment that most e¤ectively distinguishes mediocre doctors from good doctors. The former is consistent with the high admissions standards for medicine major; while the latter is consistent with the practice of internship and strict licensing in the medical profession. Table 5 focuses on parameters that govern major-speci…c consumption values. The …rst two columns show how these values vary with own ability and peer ability. The three majors with highest average wages and social science major are the most satisfying for high ability individuals. Except for engineering, e¤ort costs in these majors are also the most responsive to peer abilities. Relative to other majors, the consumption value of business major is not very responsive to one's own ability, however, high peer ability signi…cantly increases the e¤ort cost for business students. The last column of Table 5 shows that compared to average male students, average female students have higher tastes for the conventional "feminine" majors: health 35 As mentioned earlier, our model is silent about why peer ability a¤ects one's market return. These reasons are likely to di¤er across majors, for example, the high elasticity of peer ability in business major may arise because the social network one forms in college is highly valued in the business profession. and education, but lower tastes for all the other majors. 
Model Fit
Overall, the model …ts the data well. The …rst two columns of Table 6 show the fraction of all students enrolled in each tier. The model slightly under-predicts the enrollment in the top tier and over-predicts that in the other two tiers. The last two columns of Table 6 show the same statistics among females. Table 7 shows the distribution of enrollees across majors, where each column adds up to 100%. For all enrollees, the discrepancy is most obvious in the two smallest majors: the enrollment in medicine is over-predicted and that in law is underpredicted. For female enrollees, the model underpredicts the fraction of enrollees in social sciences and overpredicts that in education. Table 8 (Table 9) shows the …t of average student ability and retention rates by tier (major). By tier, the ability measures are closely matched but the retention rate for Tier 3 is overpredicted by about 5%: By major, ability is under-predicted for social science and retention rate is over-predicted for science.
Figures 1 to 8 show the …t of major-speci…c wage patterns. The biggest discrepancy occurs in health major, where the model consistently underpredicts the wage. 
Illustration: Gender Di¤erences
In this subsection, we explore the importance of gender-speci…c preferences in explaining di¤erent enrollment patterns across genders. 37 We do so by comparing the baseline model prediction with a new equilibrium where females have the same preferences as males. 38 Table 10 shows the distribution of enrollees within each gender in the baseline equilibrium and the new equilibrium. When females share the same preferences as males, gender di¤erences in the choice of majors almost disappear: there no longer exists a major that is obviously dominated by one gender. Di¤erences between male and female choices still exist. For example, although college enrollment rate among females increases from 24:3% to 27:1% (not shown in the Table) ; it is still lower than that among males (35:9%) : Moreover, compared with males, females are still less likely to enroll in medicine and science and more likely to enroll in social science. One reason is that, on average, males have higher test scores than females; and they have comparative advantage in majors that uses one's math skill more than one's language skill.
39 37 The importance of gender-speci…c preferences has been noted in the literature. For example, Zafar (2009) …nds that preferences play a strong role in the gender gap of major choices in the U.S. 38 The purpose of this simulation is simply to understand the importance of preferences; the simulation ignores potential changes in admission cuto¤s. 39 The average math score for males (females) is 572 (547), and the average language score for males (females) is 557 (553). 
Counterfactual Policy Experiments
In the counterfactual experiments, we introduce college-speci…c, rather than collegemajor-speci…c, admissions to Chile. Students choose their majors after they learn about their …ts. We solve a planner's problem, who aims at maximizing total student welfare by making admission policies. 40 The constraints for the planner include: 1) a student admitted to a higher-tier college is also admitted to a lower-tier college, and 2) the planner can use only ability a to distinguish students. These two restrictions keep our counterfactual experiments closer to the current practice in Chile in dimensions other than the college-speci…c versus college-major-speci…c admissions. Restriction 1 prevents the planner from admitting a student to only the one college that the planner deems optimal, which is both far from the current Chilean practice and also may lead to mismatches due to the heterogeneity in student tastes. Restriction 2 rules out discrimination based on gender or family income.
New Model
There are four stages in this new environment: Stage 1: The planner announces college-speci…c admissions policies: Stage 2: Students make enrollment decisions:
Stage 3: An enrollee in college j takes courses in majors within his/her broad academic interests and learn his/her e¢ ciency levels in these majors. Then, he/she chooses one of these majors or to drop out. Stage 4: Students who chose to stay in college in Stage 3 stay one more period studying in the major of choice and then enter the labor market. The planner acts as the Stackelberg leader in this game, knowing that di¤erent admissions decisions would lead to di¤erent equilibrium outcomes in the following coordination game among students. Instead of simple unidimensional cuto¤s, optimal admissions policies will be based on the whole vector of student ability a. In the following, we describe the model formally, readers not interested in the details may skip to the result section.
Student Problem
Denote M a as the set of majors that are within the broad academic interest of a student with ability a; and jM a j as the number of majors in this set.
Continuation Decision After the …rst period, a student with ability a learn about his/her abilities within M a : Given x; ; f m g m2Ma and A j fA jm g m ; an enrollee in college j chooses one major of interest or to drop out:
Let y 2 mjj x; ; f m g m2Ma = 1 if an enrollee in j with x; ; f m g m2Ma chooses major m:
Enrollment Decision We assume that in the …rst period of college, an enrollee pays the average cost for and derives the average consumption value from majors within his/her broad academic interest. 41 At the enrollment stage, a student chooses the best among colleges he/she is admitted to and the outside option:
where q (a) is the planner's admissions rule toward student with ability a; and j (q (a)) = 1 if such a student is admitted to college j: Let y 1 j (x; jq (a)) = 1 if a student with characteristics (x; ) chooses college j under the admissions rule q (a) :
Planner' s Problem
One can show that in this environment, it is not optimal to use simple unidimensional cuto¤s as admissions criteria. Instead, the whole vector of student ability a should be taken into consideration. To calculate the bene…t of applying some q (a) to a student of ability a; the planner has to consider the expected individual value for this student, as well as his/her expected e¤ect on peer quality. Peer quality matters both because it a¤ects the market return via the human capital production and because it a¤ects student e¤ort cost. Both the student's individual value and his/her e¤ect on other students'welfare may di¤er with q (a) because his/her choices may change with q (a) : Comparing across all possible q (a) toward student a; the planner chooses the best one. Overall, planner's optimal admissions policies lead student sorting toward the maximization of total student welfare. Formal discussions are provided in the appendix.
Equilibrium
De…nition 2 An equilibrium in this new system consists of a set of student enrollment and continuation strategies
; a set of admissions policies fq (a)g ; and the characteristics of academic programs f jm g ; including enrollment and average student ability A = fA jm g jm , such that
is an optimal choice of major for every (x; ; f m g m2Ma );
(b) Given (A; q (a)) ; y 1 j (x; jq (a)) j is an optimal enrollment decision for every (x; ) ; (c) q (a) is an optimal admissions policy for every a; (d) Consistency condition holds: f jm g is consistent with fq (a)g and individual student decisions:
In the appendix, we provide formal theoretical details and describe our algorithms to compute local equilibria and verify global optimality.
Results
Welfare
One of our major goals is to compare welfare under di¤erent admissions systems.
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One factor that deserves special attention is the amount of major-speci…c human capital that may be lost when specialized training is postponed. 43 We consider various possible scenarios and provide bounds on welfare gains under the counterfactual admissions system. 44 To this end, we conduct two sets of experiments, solve for new equilibria to compare with the equilibrium under the baseline.
In the …rst set of experiments, we assume that to make up for the …rst period (2 years) of college spent without specialization, students have to spend, respectively, 0, 1 and 2 extra year(s) in college. Table C1 shows the equilibrium enrollment, retention and student welfare under the baseline and the new admissions system with di¤erent lengths of college life. In all cases, postponing major choices until after students learn about their …ts increases the overall retention rate from 75% to around 90% : a signi…cant fraction of dropouts occur in the current system because of student-major mismatches. In the …rst counterfactual case, enrollment increases from 29% to 39%; and the mean student welfare increases by about 4:6 million pesos or 5%. When one has to spend one more year in college, college enrollment decreases sharply to 28% but welfare is still 1:2 million pesos higher than the baseline case. In the third case where a student accumulates zero marketable human capital in the …rst period, the new system causes a 0:9% welfare loss relative to the baseline case. However, we believe the last case to be overly pessimistic. 42 As a caveat, our policy experiment assumes an open economy and holds the wage functions unchanged. A more comprehensive model would consider the reactions of labor demand to the new regime, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 43 On the other hand, if the labor market values the width of one's skill sets, one would expect greater gains from the new system than those predicted in this paper. 44 The data we have does not allow us to predict the exact change in human capital associated with the shift of admissions regimes. In the second set of experiments, instead of extending college life for all majors, we take an arguably more realistic approach and treat majors di¤erently. 45 For the two most specialized and prestigious majors, law and medicine, students have to spend extra time in college to make up for the non-specializing …rst period. For other majors, the lengths of studies keep unchanged at the cost of potential losses of human capital due to reduced years of specialization. Speci…cally, we assume that under the new system, for a major other than law and medicine, the amount of human capital achieved in college is given by (1 ) h m (a m ; A jm ; m ); where is the fraction of human capital lost ceteris paribus. Given this framework, we seek the combinations of the number of extra years (up to two years) in law and medicine and the fraction for other majors that equalize student welfare between the old system and the new system. The two combinations that satisfy this condition are either 1) law and medicine majors extend for 1 year, and = 23% for other majors; or 2) law and medicine majors extend for 2 years, and = 19:5% for other majors.
The …rst two rows of Table C2 show di¤erent con…gurations of year requirement and ; the next two rows show the corresponding equilibrium enrollment and welfare. Although by construction the average welfare under Combinations 1 and 2 is the same as the baseline, enrollment rates under both combinations are about 7% lower than the baseline. It follows that under Combinations 1 and 2, some former enrollees choose the outside option and experience welfare loss. In contrast, average enrollees in the new system gain because they are able to choose the best match after learning about their …ts. The last column of Table C2 shows results from a third (year, ) combination such that the overall enrollment rate in the new system equals that in the baseline. Arguably, it is overly pessimistic to think that the …rst two years are totally unproductive for law and medical students, we therefore examine the medium case, where these students have to spend one more year in college to …nish their specialized training. Given this time line, we …nd that a reduction = 8:5% in other majors will keep enrollment at the baseline level. Given the same total enrollment, the following subsection compares the distribution of students under the baseline and the new system Combination 3. Table C3 displays enrollment and retention rates by tier. Compared to the baseline case, the new system features more students enrolled in both the top tier (Tier 1) and the bottom tier (Tier 3), and fewer in the middle tier. What explains the growth of Tier 1 relative to Tier 2? Under the old system, a nontrivial fraction of students were eligible to enroll in Tier 1 but only for majors other than their ex-ante most desirable ones. Among these students, some opted for their favorite majors in Tier 2 rather than a di¤erent major in Tier 1. Under the new system, the planner still deem (some of) these students suitable for Tier 1, and some of them will matriculate.
Enrollment and Major Choice Distribution
46 This is because, regardless whether or not these students eventually choose their ex-ante favorite majors, given their relatively high ability, enrolling them in Tier 1 does not have a signi…cant negative e¤ect on peer quality, while the improved match quality signi…cantly increases the net bene…ts of doing so. What explains the growth of Tier 3 relative to Tier 2? Although the total enrollment remains the same, the composition of enrollees changes as the system shifts. On the one hand, some former outsiders choose to enroll given the prospect of a better 46 Some of these students will opt for a lower-ranked tier due to tastes. match. A large fraction of them are students with relatively low ability, whom are deemed suitable only for hence admitted only to Tier 3 by the planner. On the other hand, some former enrollees choose the outside option because of the potential loss of either time or human capital embedded in Combination 3. Since one's outside value increases with one's ability, a lot of students in this group are former Tier 2 enrollees who have middle-level abilities. Table C3 also shows that retention rates in all three tiers improve signi…cantly with the change of the system. In fact, even the worst case under the new system (Tier 3) features a retention rate that is 10% higher than the best case under the old system (Tier 1). Table C4 displays the distribution of students across majors in the …rst and second period in college. 47 Focusing on the …rst four columns, we see some changes that might have been expected. For example, without major-speci…c barriers to enrollment, the fraction of students increases in law and medicine, the two most prestigious majors; while both social science and education majors lose students. Some changes are, however, less expected. For example, the fraction in engineering decreases and that in science increases, both of which use similar combinations of skills. This arises because some former engineering students opt for even more lucrative majors even if they are suitable for engineering, and some …nd out that they are not suitable for engineering. It is also related to the human capital production technology: the market return to science major is very responsive to both own ability and peer ability (see Table 4 ). In the new system, the …rst-period peers for a would-be science student include some of the best students who have very high science ability although whose …nal best choices may not be science. The enhanced peer quality, reinforced by the strong complementarity between own ability and peer ability for science major, makes it a more attractive major. 
Rationing
Without constraints on student major choices, the new system leads to a large increase in the number of students majoring in law and medicine. However, enrollment in these two majors are often strictly rationed regardless of the admissions system. In the following experiment, we mimic such rationing by adding one more constraint to the new system Combination 3. In particular, among all enrollees in college j; only those with law-speci…c (medicine-speci…c) ability that meets a certain cuto¤ have the option to major in law (medicine). 48 We conduct a series of experiments with di¤erent cuto¤s and report results from the one where the …nal number of students in each law (medicine) program equals the number of available slots as proxied by the enrollment size of the corresponding program under the baseline. The last two columns of Table C4 show the equilibrium enrollment with rationing.
49 By construction, the fraction of students majoring in law (medicine) is cut down to its capacity. It is not clear a priori how enrollment in unrationed majors 48 These cuto¤s are taken as given by both the planner and the students. An interesting and ambitious extension is to endogenize these cuto¤s. 49 Compared to the unrationed case, rationing decreases student welfare by 132 thousand pesos, or 0:1%: may change because two con ‡icting e¤ects coexist. On the one hand, given total enrollment, enrollments in unrationed majors should increase as rationed-out students reallocate themselves. On the other hand, some students who would enroll without rationing may be discouraged from enrolling at all as they are denied of the option to major in law and medicine. Indeed, as shown in the last row of Table C4 , 2:7% fewer students are enrolled in the …rst period when rationing is imposed. Due to the domination of this second e¤ect, engineering, health and science majors all become smaller. The only major where the …rst e¤ect dominates is business, which becomes slightly larger. Table C5 shows the mean log starting wages (in 1000 pesos) by major, which also re ‡ects the average productivity by major. With or without rationing, allowing students to learn their …ts before choosing their majors improves the quality of matches and hence productivity in all majors compared to the baseline case. This is true even though Combination 3 assumes a 8:5% loss of human capital ceteris paribus for majors other than law and medicine.
When enrollment in law and medicine is rationed, the average productivity increases even further in both majors, which consist of only the very best students. As students who are rationed out of law and medicine reallocate themselves, two con‡icting e¤ects occur for the average productivity in other majors. On the one hand, some rationed-out students have higher abilities in multiple majors over an average student; even if their comparative advantages are in law or medicine, they will improve the average productivity in the majors they ‡ow into. On the other hand, some rationed-out students are ill suited for other majors and they will drag down the average productivity in the majors they ‡ow into. Comparing the last two columns of Table C5 , we see that the resulting changes in the productivity of unrationed majors are marginal. However, at least in one major we can clearly see the dominance of the second e¤ect: the major of business gains not only in size (shown in Table C4 ), but also in average productivity due to the in ‡ow of high-ability students.
Conclusion
In many countries, college admissions are college-major-speci…c: a student has to choose a college-major pair in making his/her enrollment decision. When students are uncertain about their …ts across majors, serious mismatches may occur. We explore the equilibrium e¤ects of postponing students'choices of majors until after they have learned about their …ts. To do so, we develop an equilibrium college-major choice model under the college-major-speci…c admissions system, allowing for uncertainty and peer e¤ects. We apply our model to the case of Chile and recover the structural parameters underlying the equilibrium sorting among Chilean students. Our model is able to capture most of the patterns observed in the data. We model our counterfactual policy regime as a Stackelberg game in which a social planner chooses college-speci…c admissions policies and students make enrollment decisions, learn about their …ts to various majors and then choose their majors. We have showed changes in the distribution of student educational outcomes and provided bounds on potential welfare gains from adopting the new system.
Although our empirical application is based on the case of Chile, our framework is general enough to be applied to other countries with similar admissions systems. We view the methods developed in this paper and our main empirical results as promising for future research. One interesting extension is to model human capital production explicitly as a cumulative process and to measure achievement at each stage of one's college life, so as to provide a more precise estimate of the impacts on student welfare when the admissions system changes. This extension requires information on student performance in college and/or market returns to partial college training. A2 Estimation and Equilibrium-Searching Algorithm Without analytical solutions to student problem, we resort to numerical procedure to integrate out their unobserved tastes: for every student with observable characteristics x; we draw R sets of taste vectors ; which are …xed throughout. The estimation involves an outer loop searching over the parameter space and an inner loop searching for equilibrium. Finding a local equilibrium can be viewed as a classical …xed-point problem of an equilibrium correspondence : O ) O; where O = [0; 1] 0; A JM ; o = f jm ; A jm g jm : Such a mapping exists, based on this mapping, we design the following algorithm to compute equilibria numerically. 0) For each parameter con…guration, set the initial guess of o at the level we observe from the data, which is the realized equilibrium. 1) Given o; solve student problem backwards for every (x; ) pair, and obtain enrollment decision y As such, the probability that a student is admitted to college j, denoted as j (q (a)), is given by
Consistent with the assumptions on student course taking, we assume that in the …rst period in college, a student with interest set M a will take 1 jMaj slot in each m 2 M a ; and that in the second period in college, he/she will take one slot in his/her chosen major and zero slot in other majors. Let z = [In; g] be the part of x that is not observable to the planner, the planner's problem reads:
is the expected utility of student with ability a; integrating out student characteristics that are unobservable to the planner.
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For each a; one can take the …rst order conditions with respect to fq n (a)g 4 n=1 ; subject to the constraint that q (a) 2 Q. Given the nature of this model, the solution is generically at a corner with one of the q n (a)'s being one. As such, we use the following algorithm to solve the planner's problem. For each student a; we check the net bene…t of each of the four pure strategies ([1; 1; 1] ; [0; 1; 1] ; [0; 0; 1] ; [0; 0; 0]). The (generically unique) strategy that generates the highest net bene…t is the optimal admissions policy for this student: Let " " stand for (q (a) ; A) ; it can be shown that 51 Given that test scores are continuous variables, we nonparametrically approximate F zja (z) by discretizing test scores and calculating the data distribution of z conditional on discretized scores. In particular, we divide math and language test scores each into n narrowly de…ned ranges and hence generate n 2 bins of test scores. All a 0 s in the same bin share the same F zja (z) :
the net bene…t of applying some q (a) to student with ability a is:
The …rst line of (1) is the expected individual net bene…t for student a: An individual student has e¤ect on his/her peer's net bene…ts because of his/her e¤ect on peer quality: the second line calculates his/her e¤ect on his/her peers'market return; the third line calculates his/her e¤ect on his/her peers e¤ort costs. Peers of student a are those who study in the programs he/she takes courses in. Student a 0 s e¤ect on his/her peers is weighted by his/her course-taking intensity 1 jMaj . To be more speci…c, y
is the probability that a student with ability a matriculates in college j: j ( )y 1 j (aj ) is the probability that student a is enrolled in college j: 1 jm is the size of program (j; m) in the …rst period, where each student a takes 1 jMaj seat in major m 2 M a : A jm is the average ability among these students.
The second line of (1) relates to market return. b m is the part of expected lifetime income that is common to all graduates from major m: 52 K jm is the average individual
2 ) , so that the expected major-m market value of student with ability a can be written as
contribution to the total market return among students who take courses in (j; m) :
The higher a m is relative to A jm ; the bigger one's marginal contribution to the total market return of one's peers. The third line of (1) relates to e¤ort cost.
2 jm is the size of program (j; m) in the second period: A 0 jm is the average ability among students enrolled in (j; m) in the second period. Formally,
where
is the probability that student a will take a full slot in (j; m) in the second period conditional on enrollment in j: where the components of jm are as de…ned in A3.1.
A3.2.2 Equilibrium-Searching Algorithm:
To integrate over unobserved tastes, we use the same random taste vectors for each student as we did for the estimation. In the new model, student continuation problem does not have analytical solution, so we also draw K sets of random e¢ ciency vectors , …xed throughout. After …nding the local equilibrium, we verify ex post that the planner's decisions satisfy global optimality. Since it is infeasible to check all possible deviations, we use the following algorithm to check global optimality. Given an old local equilibrium o = ; we perturb o by changing its components for a random program (j; m) and search for a new equilibrium using the algorithm described in A3.2.2. If the algorithm converges to a new equilibrium with higher welfare, global optimality is violated. After a substantial random perturbations with di¤erent magnitudes, we have not found a new equilibrium. This suggests that our local equilibrium is a true equilibrium. b Business and education majors allow student to use either social science or science scores to form their indices, students use the higher score if they took both tests. Table A2 .1 shows that relative to the outside value a high school graduate faces, the outside value faced by a college dropout is about 3% higher. Table A2 .2 displays major-independent parameters that govern one's consumption value. The left panel shows parameters for the consumption value one attaches to a college program and the right panel for the consumption value of majors. Relative to Tier 3 colleges, Tier 2 colleges are more attractive to an average student, while top-tier colleges are less attractive. One possible explanation is that the two top tier colleges are both located in the city of Santiago, where the living expenses are much higher than the rest of Chile. As shown by the standard deviations of student tastes, there exists substantial unobserved heterogeneity in student educational preferences. 1618.5 (242.8) 3 is normalized to 0: Table A2 .3 shows major-independent parameters that govern the cost of college. 55 We cannot reject the hypothesis that the outside value depends only on math and language scores, therefore, we restrict l for other test scores to be zero. Table A2 .4 shows other parameters entering the log wage function. The last two rows shows the dispersions of transitory wage shocks and permanent e¢ ciency shocks realized after enrollment, each of which explains about 50% of log wage variance. Mean test scores among students who chose the outside option.
